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The "monopoly" authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power
ofindividual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition ofindividual patent
rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never
justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.
Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient
commercialization ofpatented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be
used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an
unearned monopoly position in the relevant echnology market. A producer equires
only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring the combination it can impede product
market rivals by limiting their access to important technological inputs. Similarly, a
patent assertion entity (PAE) may acquire substitute patents to eliminate inter-
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licensor competition, enabling it to charge supra-competitive license fees, much like
a merger or cartel. For example, by acquiring two or more substitute patents that
collectively dominate a market a PAE can effectively monopolize the technology for
that market. Such anticompetitive practices are regularly condemned in conventional
product contexts, but the courts have not yet applied the same antitrust logic to patent
markets. And they passively encourage anticompetitive patent acquisitions by award-
ing large damages when such patents are infringed.
We propose that infringement damages for an externally acquired patent be de-
nied if the acquisition served materially to expand or perpetuate the plaintiff's dom-
inant position in the relevant technology market. By weakening enforcement, this
limits the patent holder's ability to use such acquisitions to anticompetitive nds. We
do not suggest hat a dominant patent holder should be prohibitedfrom securing ex-
ternal patent rights in the relevant technology market, but simply that its acquisition
be limited to a nonexclusive license. This will permit the acquirer to practice the
patent and keep its own technology up to date, but will not enable it to restrict third
party access. This is as valuable to patent policy as it is to antitrust, for it will tend
to increase innovation by discouraging systematic monopoly in technology markets.
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I. Introduction
Patent alienability' plays an important role in facilitating the efficient commer-
cialization of patented inventions. The firm best suited to commercialize a given
patent may not be the original patentee. However, while patent alienability is gener-
ally good, it can be abused. For example, virtually everyone agrees that ownership
interests in a firm should be alienable, but under certain circumstances the sale of a
firm to a competitor may undermine competition and injure consumers. Anticompet-
itive acquisitions are therefore prohibited by the antitrust laws.2 Patent assignments
may also be used to anticompetitive ends. In particular, they may be used to aggre-
gate substitute patents from external sources, giving the acquirer an unearned monop-
oly position in the relevant technology market.3 Patents are "assets" for purposes of
the antitrust laws, and thus can be made subject to the Clayton Act's provision against
anticompetitive mergers.' To date, however, no court has applied the antitrust laws
to the types of transactions we discuss.
Patent acquisitions by a dominant patent holder' may facilitate two kinds of an-
ticompetitive activity. First, if the acquirer is also a producer, then it may use such
acquisitions to impede its product market rivals by restricting their access to im-
portant technological inputs. In this case the acquisition is aimed at exclusion in the
product market. Second, a non-practicing entity (NPE6) may acquire a dominant po-
sition in a technology market in order to eliminate competition between licensors,
allowing it to charge supra-competitive license fees. Given the limited ability of
NPEs to obtain injunctions' the goal is presumably not to prevent someone else from
acquiring patent rights, but rather to make them pay an excessive price for the privi-
lege. In this way, it is essentially identical to a traditional anticompetitive merger or
cartel agreement.
1 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2016) (patents "shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing").
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2016) (prohibiting acquisitions of "the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital" or "the whole or any part of the assets of" another firm when the result is "substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly"). See generally 4 & 4A PILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 900-90 (4th ed. 2016) (generally discussing mergers).
3 By "technology market" (or "patent market") we refer to a market for the rights to technologies
performing a particular kind of function, e.g., alternative methods for making solar panels. Thus, as
with any market, the "goods" that comprise this market are substitutes, although not necessarily
perfect substitutes.
4 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at ¶ 1202f3.
s By "dominant patent holder" we mean a firm which controls the rights to a significant fraction of
available technologies performing a particular kind of function, i.e., it has a dominant position in the
relevant technology market.
6 An NPE is a firm that owns and enforces patents but does not actually produce anything that reads
on them. Such firms are alternatively referred to as "patent assertion entities" or, more pejoratively,
as "patent trolls."
See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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We propose that infringement damages for an externally acquired patent should
be denied if the acquisition serves materially to expand or perpetuate the plaintiffs
dominant position in the relevant echnology market. Patent acquisitions are gener-
ally addressed under the antitrust laws, although patent law could achieve similar
results by making anticompetitive acquisition operate as a defense to an infringement
action. By preventing firms from monetizing anticompetitively acquired patents, the
law could discourage them from entering into such transactions in the first place. The
proposed limits do not prevent a dominant patent holder from obtaining external pa-
tent rights in the relevant technology market, but merely prevents it from acquiring
more than a nonexclusive license. Nonexclusive licenses permit the dominant firm
to acquire all it needs to keep its own technology up to date, but not the right to ex-
clude others.
This proposal limits a firm's ability to use patent assignments to achieve mo-
nopoly in technology markets. Without any limitations on patent alienability, firms
will tend to allocate patents in whatever way maximizes total profits of all firms in
the relevant technology space. This will typically involve allocating patents to
achieve monopoly, or at least to make the technology market noncompetitive, be-
cause competition erodes profits. This is not the only important benefit, however.
Modem economic research on innovation suggests that innovation is maximized
when a market is relatively competitive, not monopolized.' This implies that the pro-
posed limits on enforcement would promote innovation, and are therefore as im-
portant to patent law's objectives as they are to antitrust law's objectives.
Limiting infringement damages is an effective and convenient way to apply the
antitrust laws to anticompetitive patent acquisitions. As we develop later, the costs
of such enforcement could also be considerably less than antitrust enforcement, in at
least some cases.' Clayton Act enforcement attaches to the acquisition itself, and
many NPEs acquire portfolios of thousands of patents, many of which have never
been evaluated in an infringement action. Simply determining whether they operate
as substitutes could be an extraordinarily expensive undertaking, and probably un-
necessary given that many of these patents will never be asserted. By contrast, the
infringement action necessarily involves a small subset of patents, and claim con-
struction is necessary in any event. At that time, determining whether the infringe-
ment plaintiff has anticompetitively assembled a dominant position in substitute tech-
nologies adds relatively little cost. An accused infringer could either assert a defense
directly under the Patent Act, or else assert an antitrust counterclaim for monopoliza-
tion or attempt to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act.10
8 See infra Part V.
9 See discussion infra Part IV.
o 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).
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Under this approach, patents obtained through anticompetitive assignments are
essentially rendered benign, because their new owners cannot profitably enforce
them. This makes the "shadow of litigation" largely unthreatening to prospective
users, and thus the prospect of enforcement cannot be used to exclude rivals or charge
supra-competitive license fees.
A. Patents and Antitrust: Common Concerns but Distinct Approaches
Patent enforcement mechanisms are mainly private. Remedies include both
damages and private injunctive relief." Such actions are essential to patent law's
overall goal of promoting innovation and the efficient commercialization of patented
technologies. So they are not "private" at all in the sense that their purpose is simply
to transfer wealth from one person to another, or to provide compensation for past
harms. Rather, patent damages should give the patentee the correct set of incentives
to innovate by deterring infringers. Antitrust damages actions serve a similar purpose
within antitrust's domain.
Nevertheless, private enforcement is even more central to the patent system than
to antitrust. Antitrust laws are enforced by a mixture of public and private enforce-
ment actions.12 Although private plaintiffs file more cases, many of the most im-
portant cases, including all criminal cases and virtually all merger cases, are brought
by government agencies.'3 Patent law's overwhelming private enforcement structure
places a premium on identifying and maintaining the appropriate linkage between the
goals of patent law and the remedies that shape private enforcement and licensing
incentives. A well-designed system for issuing patents with the goal of facilitating
innovation and efficient licensing can be undermined by a misguided, remedial sys-
tem.
Although antitrust and patent law are both concerned with economic welfare and
growth, they take different approaches to certain fundamental economic issues, such
as market structure and strategic behavior. Antitrust law is highly sensitive to ques-
tions about market structure (the organization and competitiveness of markets), firm
mobility, and information flow. Antitrust's "per se" rule, which condemns a set of
antitrust practices without significant inquiry into market issues, occupies an ever-
shrinking domain within antitrust law.14 Under the rule of reason that governs most
antitrust claims, including those at issue here, questions concerning the structure and
' 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2016); id. § 284 (2016).
12 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2016) (permitting criminal sanctions); id. § 15 (2016) (permitting private civil suits);
id. § 15a (2016) (permitting public, federal suits); id. § 15c (2016) (permitting parens patriae suits);
id. § 26 (2016) (permitting private injunctive relief).
3 Bill Baer, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Remarks Delivered to European
Competition Forum: Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, at 5, 7, 10 (Feb.
11, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/303686.pdf).
14 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
515, 516-17 (2015).
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operations of markets are decisive.15 This is true for virtually all joint ventures, single-
firm monopolization, vertical restrictions, and mergers. One cannot determine ille-
gality without analyzing the market, the way that firms, products, and information
move within it, and how the challenged restraint affects that movement.
In sharp contrast, patent law is largely indifferent to structural issues, almost
never asking these questions when adjudicating disputes. Even questions about mar-
ket structure that are directly related to how innovations are incentivized or dissemi-
nated are largely ignored.16 Indeed, the only reference to market power in the Patent
Act is a negative one. Section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act permits patent tying ar-
rangements except in circumstances where the patentee holds market power in the
tying patent or patented product."
Patent law also takes little to no account of strategic or "monopolistic" behavior,
including such things as dominant firms that exclude rivals by buying up patents in
their domain." In other words, patent law largely proceeds as if markets do not matter
and is largely indifferent to the question of whether strategic behavior is harmful or
beneficial. Indeed, courts often decline even to acknowledge "patent markets"-the
medium through which related patents are assigned, licensed, or enforced-as a rel-
evant market for antitrust purposes.1 9
Today most economists agree that relatively competitive markets are more con-
ducive to innovation than monopolized markets.20 The relationship between innova-
tion and market structure is commonly characterized as an inverted U, with most in-
novation done by firms in moderately competitive markets, and less done by either
perfect competitors or absolute monopolists21 Furthermore, much of the recent em-
pirical work on the subject suggests that this inverted U curve is lopsided toward the
1 Id. at 516; on the relevance of structure in horizontal merger cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl
Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2018) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3046224).
16 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467,
503-04 (2015).
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2016):
No patent owner False . . shall be deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having False . . (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the
patented product or the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
'9 See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2013 WL
6682981, at *9 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (rejecting the possibility that Intellectual Ventures' patent
portfolio provided a dominant position in a "relevant market").
20 Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON.
701, 701 (2005); see infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
21 Herbert Hovenkamp, Intellectual Property and Competition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (Peter Mennell et al. eds., 2015), available at http://pa-
pers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2569129.
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competitive side, at least up to a point, suggesting more innovation as markets are
more competitive.22 The curve reflects that both monopoly and perfect competition
have problems that undermine innovation: a monopolist has ample means to invest in
innovation, but the absence of competition diminishes its incentive to do so.2 3 By
contrast, a perfectly competitive firm is highly motivated to innovate and thereby
distinguish itself from competitors, but it lacks the resources to make significant in-
vestments in R&D.24
Unlike patent law, antitrust law attempts to manage competition and innovation
issues simultaneously, knowing that they are interlinked and one cannot be controlled
without affecting the other. For example, anticompetitive restraints on innovation
can be just as unlawful as anticompetitive restraints on product competition-even
more to the extent that innovation contributes more to economic growth than does
increased competition under constant technology.2 5 The Government's Merger
Guidelines recognize that mergers should be prohibited if they reduce innovation in-
centives." On the other side, antitrust policy is highly tolerant of true innovation
even if it is achieved through monopoly. For example, the courts more or less con-
sistently hold that innovation itself can never be attacked as an antitrust violation,
even if it transforms the innovator into a dominant firm.27 Acting under the rule of
reason, antitrust law is also highly sensitive to both the significant benefits and com-
petitive threats that can result from collaborative innovation, pooling or other sharing
of IP rights, and standard setting.2 8 In short, built into antitrust is a set of tools that
permit courts simultaneously to address the costs and benefits to innovation and com-
petition in specific settings.
Another difference between patent law and antitrust law lies in the way that
courts are forced to confront fundamental policy issues. In patent cases, the lower
courts apply the statute, but they rarely address directly the question of whether a
particular practice promotes innovation. Patent law has no equivalent to the "antitrust
22 Id.
23 Aghion et al., supra note 20, at 702.
24 Id.
25 E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510 (1988) (condemning
restraint intended to exclude innovative product from market); see Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints
on Innovation, 29 CARDOZo L. REv. 247, 253-54 (2007).
26 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 6, 6.4, 10
(2010). See also Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Speech
at Advanced Antitrust U.S.: The Forward-Looking Nature of Merger Analysis (Feb. 6, 2014) (tran-
script available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public statements/forward-looking-
nature-merger-analysis/140206mergeranalysis-dlf.pdf).
27 E.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir.
2010).
28 See generally 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW TT 2230-35 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the
making and enforcement of industry standards).
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injury" doctrine in antitrust law, which is entirely judge made.2 9 Under that doctrine
a court must dig below the surface when assessing a private claim for antitrust dam-
ages in order to confirm that the request for damages is consistent with antitrust's
goals."o Its main message is that even if an alleged harm flows from an antitrust vio-
lation, no antitrust damages will be available if the rationale for recovery is inimical
to the goals of antitrust policy.31
The "antitrust injury" doctrine originated with Justice Thurgood Marshall's
opinion in the Brunswick case, which was a private challenge to a merger.32 Bruns-
wick, a large supplier of equipment to bowling allies, operated a program under which
it acquired and rehabilitated failing alleys that owed it money.3 3 Brunswick purchased
one of the two operating bowling alleys in Pueblo Colorado, as well as other alleys
in other cities.34 These were vertical mergers because of Brunswick's supplier rela-
tionship with the alleys." Some of them were also horizontal mergers to the extent
that Brunswick already owned alleys in the area of an acquired alley.36 The district
court had found that at least some of the mergers were unlawful and awarded signif-
icant damages.37
The private challenger in Brunswick was an acquired alley's rival who claimed
that, as a result of the acquisition, Brunswick rehabilitated its languishing competitor,
forcing the plaintiff to compete with a much more robust firm than before." In sum,
whether or not the merger was unlawful, the plaintiff was complaining about more
rather than less competition in the market.3 9 Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that
in order to recover the plaintiffs
"must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs
must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive
29 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-one Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the
Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 273 (1998).
30 See, e.g., id. at 281, 285-86.
31 See, e.g., id.
32 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
3 Id. at 479-80.
34 Id. at 480.
1 A vertical merger is one between a purchaser and a seller, such as when a manufacturer acquires a
dealership or retailer.
36 A horizontal merger is one between competitors.
37 Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316, 318-19 (D.N.J. 1973). The Ninth Circuit
vacated the judgment on remedies, but agreed with the district court on the mergers' illegality. 523
F.2d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 1975).
3 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 479-81 (1977).
39 Id. at 488.
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acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed
violations. . . would be likely to cause."4 0
The Brunswick message is that one seeking damages in an antitrust case4 1 must
show not merely a violation and injury, but also that the injury is consistent with the
underlying goals of the antitrust laws to promote competition. This reflects that most
antitrust doctrines are directed at protection of consumers, not firms. 42 Thus, if an
alleged antitrust violation injures a rival firm in a way that is unrelated to its potential
injury to competition, or if it is not sufficiently clear that consumers are likely to be
injured at all, then the rival will generally be precluded from recovering damages.
The antitrust injury doctrine cannot be defended as an exercise in statutory in-
terpretation. Just like the Patent Act damages provision, the antitrust provision is
very broad, giving damages to any person injured in his business or property by an
antitrust violation.43  Also like the patent damages provision, the antitrust statute
makes no mention of principles of equity or other factors that may entitle a judge to
reduce or reject damages once the violation and injury have been established. This is
in sharp contrast to the injunction provisions in both statutes, which qualify entitle-
ment to relief according to general equitable principles." For example, acting under
the Patent Act provision the Supreme Court held in eBay that entitlement to an in-
junction was not automatic, but must be governed by equitable principles.45 In sum,
the injunction provisions in both statutes permit judges to "make policy" in deciding
whether to grant an injunction by weighing factors that reach beyond the plaintiffs
harm. In both cases the damages provisions contain no such authorization.
To be sure, there may be structural reasons that account for the Supreme Court's
willingness to recognize such a judge-made departure from statutory language in an-
titrust law but not patent law. The Patent Act is a detailed code, which is frequently
amended,46 inducing judges to stick more-or-less closely to its provisions. By con-
trast, the antitrust laws are relatively spare and amended less often. This has served
to make judges much more comfortable about fashioning antitrust doctrine that is not
4 Id. 489 (emphasis added) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)).
41 The doctrine was later extended to injunctions: Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S.
104, 126 (1986).
42 E.g., Jacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 286.
43 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2016) ("[A].. .ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust law may sue therefor ...... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained . . False").
" In antitrust, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2016) (There is a private right to injunction "when and under the same
conditions and principles as injunctive relief ...... is granted by the courts of equity, under the
rules governing such proceedings False . . ."); in patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2016) (Courts "may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
45 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
46 John C. Stolpa, Case Comment, Toward Aligning the Law with Biology? The Federal Circuit's
About Face in Anzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 339, 346 (2003).
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called for by the statutory text.47 For example, neither the per se rule nor antitrust's
rule of reason is specified in the antitrust statutes.
But this difference is readily exaggerated. Patent law has its own judge-made
rules that strongly limit entitlement to damages. For example, the "first sale," or
patent exhaustion, doctrine is well over a century old and in patent law is entirely
judge made,48 although it is statutory in copyright.49 Under the doctrine, someone who
purchases a patented good takes it free of any patent law restrictions placed on that
good, thereby providing a complete defense to an action for infringement based on
violation of the restriction.50 By the same token, the exclusion of "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are recognized by the Supreme Court as an
"implicit exception" to the Patent Act, which nowhere mentions them.
Similarly, a rule that the Supreme Court recently affirmed in the Kimble decision
prohibits the assessment of royalties based on use after a patent has expired.52 Since
the Patent Act says nothing about the duration of royalty provisions in license agree-
ments, the rule is entirely judge made and provides a complete defense to an action
seeking to enforce royalties that accrue after patent expiration.53 For that reason the
three dissenters protested that "nothing in the text of the Act even arguably forbids
licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties."5 4 Indeed, the entire
judge-made law of patent "misuse" was not statutory, and was intended to condemn
patent restrictions that reached "beyond the scope" of the patent." In sum, while the
Supreme Court may not have been as aggressive about grafting doctrine onto the Pa-
tent Act as it has done for the antitrust laws, judge-made policy limitations on the
ability to collect patent damages are hardly a rarity.
4 See, e.g., Nat'] Soc. Of Prof I Eng'rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
48 E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 491 (2011); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Reason-
able Patent Exhaustion, YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2018) (available at https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=299575 1).
49 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2016); see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013).
5o E.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 459 (1873) (refusing to enforce territorial restriction on use of a
patented coffin lid after it had been sold); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
621 (2008) (adhering to first sale doctrine and refusing to enforce quasi-exclusive dealing).
s' Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
52 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015) (adhering on grounds of stare decisis
to rule originally adopted in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964)).
5 ' Id.
54 Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting,). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Brulotte"s Web, 11 J. Comp. L.& EcoN.
527, 531 (2015).
1 E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (refusing to enforce patent tie
via infringement action). See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule ofReason and the Scope of
the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 515, 515 (2015).
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B. Patent Damages vs. Patent Policy
The antitrust injury doctrine has given antitrust law something that patent law
lacks, which is a mechanism for confronting the monster head on-asking whether
recovery in a particular case is consistent with the purposes of the statute, or is
simply based on raw faith that anything that infringes a patent must harm innovation,
or perhaps worse yet, that once infringement is found it does not matter.
In fact, the idea that recovery for infringement is sometimes at odds with patent
policy is not entirely unprecedented. The so-called "reverse doctrine of equivalents"
eliminates liability for a literal infringement in situations where the infringing tech-
nology is so much cleverer than the plaintiff s embodiment as to make infringement
liability inequitable.56 Under this doctrine, the courts rely on principles of equity to
deny recovery notwithstanding that the defendant's device reads on valid claims in
the plaintiff s patent." The logic is simply that it would run contrary to patent policy
to impose liability on a defendant whose device, while literally infringing, neverthe-
less constitutes a substantial innovation. To punish these innovators would under-
mine the patent system's principal ambition. Our proposals rest on a similar propo-
sition, namely that the courts ought not issue damages that passively reward patent
holders for conduct that is likely to retard innovation or unreasonably limit access to
patented technologies.
Without proposing anything so broad as a general "patent injury" or "innovation
injury" doctrine for patent damages, the balance of this essay makes narrower pro-
posals that are consistent with the current text of the Patent Act and that could be used
to make patent enforcement actions more consistent with the underlying goals of the
patent laws to promote innovation. We focus mainly on enforcement of patents that
were not developed by their current enforcers but rather were acquired by assignment
or license. Thus, the relevant innovation incentives belong in the first instance not to
the plaintiffs, but to their assignors.
Further, this inquiry is not limited to practices that also violate the antitrust laws.
An antitrust violation could certainly suffice to undermine a patent damages claim
based on the same conduct, but that decision would result from application of the
antitrust laws. In fact, one of the most severe criticisms of the patent "misuse" doc-
trine was that at some level it sought to apply antitrust principles but in fact often
56 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950) ("[W]here
a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar
function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim,
the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for
infringement.").
* Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The
so-called "'reverse doctrine of equivalents' is an equitable doctrine" used to "prevent unwarranted
extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee's invention .... ).
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found misuse when there was no antitrust violation." Patent law may have its own
reasons for denying or limiting patent damages even when no antitrust violation has
been proven.
Nevertheless, finding an antitrust violation can operate as an important policy
lever and can affect entitlement to patent damages. Any patent practice that is ex-
pressly authorized by the Patent Act is immune from antitrust scrutiny, provided that
the challenged practice stays within the scope of the authorization. For example, the
Patent Act expressly authorizes infringement actions' and domestic exclusive terri-
torial licenses,61 and provides that patent tying is lawful unless the patentee has mar-
ket power in the patent upon which the tie is conditioned.62 By contrast, the Patent
Act does not authorize price fixing or resale price maintenance of patented products,
field-of-use restrictions, exclusive dealing in patented products, pay-for-delay settle-
ments, or infringement actions based on patents that the plaintiff knows or should
know to be unenforceable.
Justice Breyer noted the importance of statutory authorization in the Supreme
Court's 2013 Actavis decision, observing repeatedly that a payment to another firm
to stay out of the patentee's market for a specified period was not authorized any-
where in the Patent Act." Although the Patent Act expressly authorizes licenses,' a
payment to someone not to produce is not a "license," and no other language in the
Patent Act served to immunize such agreements from antitrust scrutiny. A rule such
as this one is particularly appropriate when a statute is amended frequently, as the
Patent Act is.65 If Congress objects to the Supreme Court's refusal to declare a par-
ticular immunity because it is not expressly authorized by the Patent Act, it can add
authorizing language any time it pleases-including language that would authorize
pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements. That is precisely what it did in 1988, when
it added language that made patent ties lawful unless the patentee had market power
in the tying product.'
58 See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 492-93 (2011).
5 Cf 'Assessment Tech. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding
practice to be close to copyright misuse and denying enforcement, even though it did not violate
antitrust law).
60 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2016); id. § 281 (2016) (recognizing infringement action); id. § 283 (2016)
(permitting injunction, consistent with principles of equity); id. § 284 (2016) (damages).
61 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2016).
62 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2016).
63 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) ("the dissent does not identify any patent
statute that it understands to grant such a right to a patentee, whether expressly or by fair implica-
tion"). But see id. at 2238 (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority's "novel approach
is without support in any statute . . .
6 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2016).
6s See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2016).
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Second, an important principle of statutory interpretation that applies to the re-
lationship between any body of law and federal antitrust law is that general authoriz-
ing language does not serve to immunize particular anticompetitive instances of that
authorization. For example, all corporations are statutorily authorized to make con-
tracts,7 but that does not create an antitrust immunity for anticompetitive contracts
such as price fixing agreements. And while corporation law expressly permits cor-
porations to acquire the stock or assets of other corporations,8 this authorization does
not apply to anticompetitive acquisitions, and thus does not create an immunity from
the antitrust laws.69 For that reason, although patents are expressly assignable by
statute,70 they are also productive assets and are treated as such under the Clayton
Act's prohibition of anticompetitive asset acquisitions.71  And while the Patent Act
expressly authorizes infringement lawsuits,7 2 it does not authorize improper, anticom-
petitive lawsuits based on patents that should be known to the patent holder to be
improper.
Third, to conclude that a practice is not authorized under the Patent Act says
nothing about its legality under the antitrust laws. Rather, antitrust law is then free
to apply the analysis that it ordinarily applies in other settings, including per se ille-
gality for a very small set of "naked" restraints and rule of reason analysis for others,
which mandates proof of market power and anticompetitive effects. Innovation harm
must of course be considered, but antitrust law in fact has far better tools for assessing
innovation harm than patent law does for assessing competitive harm, which it virtu-
ally always ignores.
Nevertheless, failure to find an antitrust violation is not the end of the matter.
Patent law needs to have its own interest in assertions of rights to damages that are
fundamentally inimical to the purposes of the Patent Act or, in some cases that are
anticompetitive and do not further any legitimate Patent Act goal.
II. Competition Policy and Externally Acquired Patents
Permitting issued patents orpatent licenses to be transacted in a market produces
considerable gains in both static (output) and dynamic (innovation) efficiency. The
trick is to identify the relatively small subset of market transactions that are harmful.
67 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(13) (2016) ("Every corporation created under this chapter shall
have power to ...... (13) make contracts .... ).
68 See id. § 122(4) (right to "purchase" and "acquire" both "real or personal property").
69 E.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1015 (2013) (provision in statute
authorizing hospital corporation to acquire different corporation did not justify merger to monopoly).
70 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2016).
n E.g., Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, 687 F. Supp. 832, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Great
Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.) 467,467 (1984) (consent decree). See
5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at ¶ 1202f3.
72 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2016).
7 E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965).
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For assessing market transactions, the tools of antitrust have important advantages
over patent law. Guided by industrial economics, antitrust law has well-developed
methodologies for assessing market power, identifying agreements that restrain trade,
predicting the effect of specific practices, and individual tailoring of remedies in order
to further competition as well as innovation.74 By contrast, patent law analysis is typ-
ically indifferent to market effects, and sometimes even proceeds as if competition
itself were the evil to be resisted.
Section 261 of the Patent Act authorizes patentees to grant exclusive licenses
and also provides that patents can be assigned in writing.76 Clearly someone who has
acquired a patent from someone else can enforce it by either damage actions or an
injunction, and when the patent case law assesses entitlement to damages it does not
generally distinguish between internally developed patents and those acquired from
outside inventors.
Further, any treatment hat disfavors externally acquired patents too severely can
restrain innovation, particularly by smaller inventors who do not produce themselves
and rely on a secondary patent market for their returns. A well-functioning patent
market necessitates that patents generally be assigned and licensed freely. As noted
above, however, the power to transact does not include the power to transact anti-
competitively. Further, nonexclusive licenses typically achieve all of the appropriate
goals of patent transfer without any of the anticompetitive effects."
For purposes of competition policy, the distinction between internally developed
and externally acquired patents can be quite important. First, internal development
is presumptively unilateral, although some research is conducted jointly. By contrast,
transacting in patents is necessarily bilateral. This has important implications for
antitrust policy. Only a small number of unilateral actions are unlawful under the
antitrust laws. By contrast, multilateral actions are covered much more aggressively
by § 1 of the Sherman Act (all contracts and agreements, and some mergers),79 § 3 of
the Clayton Act (tying and exclusive dealing),o and § 7 of the Clayton Act (mer-
gers)."
74 Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and
Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., 2008).
7 E.g., Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see infra pp.
18-19.
76 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2016).
n See, e.g., Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1171 (holding that injunctive relief may be appropriate for an externally
acquired and unused patent if the parties are competitors). See also Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F.
Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REv. 871, 873-76 (2016).
78 See discussion infra Section III.
79 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
80 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
1 Id. at 731-32.
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Second, in order to maintain a dominant position a firm must not merely keep
its own technology up to date, it must also control the innovations of rivals or poten-
tial rivals. Developing valid patents internally and enforcing them is unilateral con-
duct, clearly authorized by the Patent Act and cannot be an antitrust violation. But in
many cases internal development alone will not exclude competing innovations by
rivals. To the extent that more competitive markets are conducive to more innova-
tion, as the literature largely concludes,' increased innovation is likely to come heav-
ily from firms that compete with the dominant firm. But many of these gains could
be lost if the dominant firm were free simply to acquire exclusive rights in patents,
particularly of patents that it does not intend to use.
The market generally determines the value of a patent, but this value will differ
depending on the degree of competitiveness and the identity of the buyer. For exam-
ple, all things equal, a dominant firm will pay more for an exclusive right o a patent
essential to the maintenance of its dominant position than would a firm attempting to
compete with the dominant firm. For the former, the value of the patent is the en-
hancement or maintenance of its dominant position. For the competitor, by contrast,
it is the much less valuable right to competitive returns in the dominant firm's market.
This reflects that industry-wide profits are generally higher when the market is less
competitive. Thus transactions that enhance or maintain market dominance will tend
to be more profitable than those that foster competition. Consequently, a patent
holder can earn more by selling an exclusive license to a dominant firm than to its
competitor, all else being equal. Note, however, that these are also the transactions
most likely to injure consumers. Further, the continued absence of competition will
tend to suppress market-wide innovation.83
How much a dominant firm will pay for a nonexclusive right o a patent presents
a completely different question, and depends on the relationship between the patent
and the firm's existing technology, and on the possible effects of competing uses of
the patents. If the patent is a desirable complement to or improvement upon the firm's
existing technology, then it will practice the patent in order to improve its own prod-
uct. In that case even a nonexclusive license is valuable, since the firm can earn more
by selling a more desirable product. An exclusive license would be more valuable to
the dominant firm, however, because this precludes competitors from implementing
competing uses of the patented technology.
By contrast, if the firm's product does not benefit from the patented technology,
then it will not use it, and thus a nonexclusive license provides no value. However,
an exclusive license may still remain quite valuable to the extent that it excludes rivals
82 See discussion supra pp. 7-8.
83 See discussion infra pp. 33-34.
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from using the invention to improve their own products, which would increase the
level of competition faced by the dominant firm.
In speaking of firms that systematically buy up patents in their area of produc-
tion, the courts sometimes suggest that they are almost always acting anticompeti-
tively.84 The issue is complex, however. A firm that aggregates complementary pa-
tents and uses them in its products is certainly not behaving anticompetitively. Xerox
is an example of a firm that created market leading products by doing that. By
contrast, aggregations of exclusive rights in substitute patents are much more suspi-
cious. A firm does not need multiple substitute patents, since it will practice only one
of them. So the systematic aggregation of substitute patents by a firm with substantial
market power (or where the aggregation threatens to produce substantial market
power) raises the possibility of unlawful monopolization.
Aggregation and nonuse of competing patents by a non-practicing entity poses
a significant competitive threat if it threatens dominance in either a product market
or in the technology market covered by the patents. The reference to technology
markets is critical because a non-practicing entity by definition cannot be a monopo-
list in the product market, where its output is zero. In one case involving patent ag-
gregator Intellectual Ventures (IV) the district court mistakenly dismissed a claim of
monopolization on the grounds that IV had no market position in the product market
for banking services, which it of course was not providing." It rejected a claim that
TV was monopolizing "the ex post market for technology used to provide commercial
84 E.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 304, 307 (1948) ("[T]here may be an aggre-
gation of patents to obtain dominance in a patent field. False . .By aggregating patents in one control,
the holder of the patents cannot escape the prohibitions of the Sherman Act."); United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (similar, quoting Line Material); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 443 (1945) (discussing a requirement of license on "patents
illegally aggregated"); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 367 (1947) (similar). See also
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F.Supp. 753, 816 (D.N.J. 1949):
... General Electric regimented an industry by, among other things, its acquisition
of patents to perpetuate a control over the incandescent electric lamp long after its
basic patents expired to maintain a dominant position, rendering it possible for it to
eliminate competition and maintain an industrial monopoly. Its aggregation of pa-
tents into its control permitted General Electric to monopolize patents and by so
doing it violated Sec. 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
85 See SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1981) (recounting Xerox's assembly of
patents in order to create plain paper copier). But cf Intellectual Ventures, LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 99 F.Supp.3d 610, 623 (D.Md. 2015) (describing aggregation by non-practicing entity and
enforcement as potential antitrust violation). See generally Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Tar-
geted Patent Aggregation, 67 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2015) (advocating limited use of antitrust).
86 Intellectual Ventures 1, LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at
*4-5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013).
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banking services."8 7 IV had acquired numerous patents directed at such services.1
The plaintiff argued that because the patents that IV had collected into its portfolio
had included all known substitutes for operating in the market it had effectively
placed banks into a position where they had to obtain a license from IV in order to
offer banking services.89 This claim seems completely consistent with § 2 of the
Sherman Act, which does not distinguish technology markets from product markets.
For that matter, it could also be addressed under Clayton Act § 7's prohibition of
anticompetitive asset acquisitions.
The patent laws permit and even encourage the development of market shifting
innovations that might serve to give the inventor substantial market power. Nothing
in the patent act, however, permits the assignment of competing patents to a single
owner with the power to foreclose all available avenues to a certain result. Suppose,
for example, that three separate inventors develop alternative technologies A, B, and
C for achieving a certain outcome. The Patent Act contemplates that these three tech-
nologies can be independently practiced by the inventors, licensed to others either
exclusively or nonexclusively, or assigned. Further, nothing in the Patent Act explic-
itly prohibits the three technologies from being assigned to the same firm. But the
general assignment provision in the Patent Act does not expressly authorize such a
transfer either, and here antitrust has an independent role.' By contrast, if a single
entity invented technologies A, B, and C and then selected one of them as optimal,
its enforcement actions based on any of the three technologies would be purely uni-
lateral acts, generally difficult to reach under the antitrust laws.9'
In this case the practicing acquirer of the three technologies would employ the
one that serves it best. Because the technologies are competing, however, it would
not practice the other two but hold them only for the purpose of excluding rivals or
potential rivals.' That conduct is not addressed by the patent laws and is fully reach-
able by antitrust laws. Indeed, it is akin to a situation in which a vertically integrated
" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See infra pp. 26-27 (discussing the decision more fully).
8 In a separate infringement litigation between IV and Capital One, several of these patents were in-
validated, and this decision was recently upheld by the Federal Circuit. See Intellectual Ventures I,
LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp, 850 F.3d 1332, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
89 Intellectual Ventures 1, 2013 WL 6682981, at *3-5.
90 For example, see Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger
Remedies, p. 11 (June 2011) (providing for IP licensing as a remedy).
91 Patenting of substitute inventions by a single inventor-sometimes called "preemptive patenting"-
is not prima facie anticompetitive. It may reflect, for example, that inventing around just one of the
patents would be relatively easy, leaving the patent weak. Thus, the inventor may be willing to
invest in innovation only if he can patent multiple variants of his idea and, therefore, prevent others
from easily inventing around him.
92 The discussion here oversimplifies by assuming that competing patents cannot also function as com-
plements. When patents have numerous claims they may sometimes operate as both complements
and substitutes. See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1324,1345 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Digital and analog patents operated as substitutes in product market, but one claim in digital
patent wrote on the analog technology, making them complements as well.).
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firm buys all competing upstream manufacturers (effecting a horizontal merger in the
upstream market) in order to deprive downstream rivals from the upstream good.
Any rule for assessing damages actions based on externally acquired patents
must then make some important tradeoffs. First, effective innovation incentives
should include the right of inventors to assign their patents to others. Second, by
common consensus, monopoly is much less conducive to innovation than is compet-
itive patent ownership. One rule that would particularly discourage innovation would
permit a single dominant firm to buy up exclusive rights to patents by others and then
keep these patents unpracticed, using them only to deter rivals from entening its mar-
ket. The courts may facilitate this outcome to the extent that they award substantial
damages to plaintiffs that acquire patents to achieve monopoly in the relevant tech-
nology market.
III. Antitrust Limits on Damages for Externally Acquired Patents
Patent enforcement by damages actions is often more conducive to maintaining
competition than patent enforcement by injunction. Injunction remedies can prevent
a competitor from entering a market at all to the extent that entry requires practice of
the infringed patents. By contrast, damages remedies place a price on competitive
entry while not necessarily excluding it altogether. To be sure, a monopolist patentee
can obtain the same result by placing an unacceptably high royalty on any patent it
owns.93 But damages remedies typically limit a patentee to "reasonable" royalties as
determined by the court. Depending on how damages are assessed these could be
significantly lower than the monopolist's optimal royalties.
When patents are acquired from external inventors, however, and particularly if
they are both externally acquired and unused, then the remedy issue is more difficult.
Now countervailing considerations for the protection of competition and the innova-
tion that it induces come into play-or, more accurately, they should come into play.
The problem with the current system is that it ignores important factors like patent
aggregation and market power when fashioning remedies. And by awarding large
damages for patents obtained through anticompetitive acquisitions, the courts pas-
sively encourage transactions that serve to choke off access to valuable patented
9 Even if it is true that a patent holder and its rival could not agree on mutually beneficial licensing
terms, implying that an ex ante bargain would have resulted in nonuse by the rival, it does not follow
that injunction would be preferable to damages if the rival infringed the patent. The defendant may
nevertheless be able to compensate the harm it imposes without shutting down; it will just have to
do so at a price that exceeds the value it derives from the infringement. For example, suppose that
the defendant-rival's use of the patent increases its profits from $9M to $1OM, but reduces the plain-
tiff's profits from $1OM to $8M. Then, mutually beneficial licensing is impossible because it hurts
the patent holder by more than it benefits the licensee. However, an injunction would still be inef-
ficient because the defendant can afford to compensate the plaintiff for its $2M injury without having
to shut down.
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inventions, and whose propensity to create monopoly will tend to undermine the pa-
tent system's ambition to promote innovation.
To mitigate the problems created by anticompetitive patent acquisitions, we of-
fer the following proposal: infringement damages should be denied when: (1) the
plaintiff acquired the infringed patent externally;' (2) the plaintiff has (or threatens
to create) a dominant position in the relevant technology market; and (3) the acquisi-
tion played a significant role in expanding or perpetuating the plaintiffs dominant
position in the technology market. While inherently an antitrust remedy, this standard
may operate in practice as a defense to infringement liability. However, the antitrust
violation (the anticompetitive acquisition) arises at the time of the patent's assign-
ment to the plaintiff, and thus a prospective licensee can challenge the acquisition
before it infringes the patent. Importantly, this standard does not preclude the domi-
nant firm from securing the benefits of the patent in question; it simply requires it to
obtain them through a nonexclusive license so as not to suppress competition in the
process.
There are a few things to note about our proposal. First, it focuses on "market
dominance" with respect to the relevant technology market-the class of technologies
performing the same or similar function as the patented invention-rather than any
product market. If the plaintiff is a producer, this may or may not translate into a
dominant position in its product market as well, depending on the extent o which the
relevant technology drives demand for the final product. However, as already noted,
antitrust seeks to ferret out restraints on competition in all markets, whether or not
the relevant "goods" happen to be sold directly to consumers. Of course, it may be
difficult to measure things like market shares or concentration in technology markets,
since there are not many transactions to measure. But a court can nevertheless infer
a dominant market position based on a finding that prospective users of the relevant
technology have very limited options aside from obtaining a license from the patent
holder.
Second, this standard requires that the plaintiff maintained a dominant position
in the technology market before acquiring the patent in question, or where the acqui-
sition created a dominant position or threatens to do so. If a patent acquisition does
no more than transfer an existing monopoly position from one firm to another, no
monopoly is created." For example, if there is a single drug that can treat a particular
disease, then monopoly power runs with its patent. If the drug is sold to a different
firm (say, because the acquiring firm is a more efficient manufacturer) then the
9 As clarified in Section III. C., infra, an exclusive license (as opposed to an assignment) should gen-
erally also be sufficient to trigger our proposed limit on enforcement.
9 See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984) (shifting monopoly
power from one party to another "has no antitrust significance"). See also Olympia Equip. Leasing
Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that it is "[n]ot the possession,
but the abuse, of monopoly power [that] violates" the antitrust laws).
57
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
acquirer has not abused a dominant position; the monopoly has simply changed own-
ership. On the other hand, if the acquirer were the only firm to have a competing
medicine, then the acquisition would increase market concentration by giving the ac-
quirer a stronger position than either firm maintained previously, and this would
likely be anticompetitive.
The following sections support the proposed limits on enforcement by consider-
ing anticompetitive acquisitions in some important contexts. The first involves ac-
quisition and nonuse by a producer with a dominant position in the relevant technol-
ogy market. The second involves acquisitions by a nonpracticing entity that create
dominance in the technology space. We also consider the case of dominant producers
who practice the acquired patent. In that case the prospect of licensing rather than
assignment-and in particular the distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive li-
censing-becomes critical. In all that follows, when we say a firm is "dominant" we
are referring to its market position in the relevant technology. Even if the firm is a
producer, it may or may not be dominant in its product market, although some of the
most interesting scenarios arise when it is dominant in both.
Also we offer a brief word on efficiencies. When antitrust's rule of reason is
applied to any transaction, efficiencies must be considered. Of course, patent acqui-
sition and actual use can create significant efficiencies, particularly if the acquired
patent complements the acquirer's existing technology. Acquisition and nonuse is a
different matter. No complementarity accrues to the acquirer, given that i is not
taking advantage of the acquired patent in its own production processes. To the extent
that such an acquisition has any impact on efficiency it lies in precluding a rival from
taking advantage of the acquired but unused technology. It is extremely difficult,
however, to make any case that keeping a commercially valuable technology off the
market does anything other than decrease social welfare. As a result we would favor
a strong presumption that an acquisition and nonuse produces no cognizable efficien-
cies, at least on balance.
One possible exception might occur if the acquirer intends to use the acquired
patent in the future after it modifies its own technology to make the acquired patent
more complementary. Another, more dynamic efficiency might accrue to the extent
that the ability to sell an exclusive license to a dominant firm will provide a higher
price than the sale or multiple nonexclusive licenses. As a result, the right to make
such a sale might increase the incentives to the original inventor. Whether it does so,
however, is hardly clear.96
96 See discussion infra Section V.
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A. Patent Acquisition and Nonuse by Dominant Producers
As a general matter property owners are free to use their property or not, without
subjecting themselves to adverse consequences from the State. The general rule is
subject to a few qualifications. For example, unused property is more susceptible to
being lost by adverse possession. By and large, however, legal policy has not taken
a particularly aggressive position against unused property even though outside ob-
servers might regard nonuse as inefficient. For example, if Ford owns an unused
production facility it can bring a trespass or similar action against another firm, such
as Chrysler, who might start using it without permission. Of course, in this case
Chrysler remains free to produce an identical factory of its own, and this outside op-
tion might persuade Ford to sell its unused factory.
Patents raise somewhat different issues. The owner of an unused patent has the
right to compensation for infringement of that patent, whether or not the "trespasser"
developed the technology entirely on its own, and even if it did not know it was in-
fringing. Further, the trespasser cannot simply reproduce the patent in the way a rival
car manufacturer can replicate a factory; it must invent around the patent, or else take
advantage of an existing noninfringing substitute in order bring its own product to
market. As a result, the unused patent potentially creates more "dead space" in the
market than does the unused production facility.
Historically patent law recognized this fact and developed such devices as
"working clauses" requiring patents to be practiced within a few years after issu-
ance,7 or in some cases even gave the sovereign the power to revoke a patent for
nonuse.98 The Supreme Court's 1908 Paper Bag decision held, however, that a pa-
tentee can enforce an unused patent." The principal more recent limitation is the
substantial body of case law following the Supreme Court's eBay decision to the ef-
fect that the owner of an unpracticed patent may not be able to obtain an injunction,
but must be relegated to damages.1oo
A particularly serious case involving externally acquired patents involves a mo-
nopolist (in the product market) that acquires an outside patent that would be effective
in creating competition if another firm were able to practice it. Thus the acquisition
allows the firm to maintain a chokehold on the technology needed to compete in the
product market. Instead of practicing this patent itself, however, the monopolist
9 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARz. L. REv. 263,
283 (2016).
98 Id. at 282-83.
99 Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1908).
100 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). See Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F.
Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871, 875-76 (2016) (noting that in-
junctions are less common after eBay); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2013) (noting that injunctions are less
common after eBay).
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continues with its existing technology, not using the acquired patent but merely hold-
ing it to limit the options available to competitors. Upon seeing an outside patent
with such power, a dominant firm would be willing to pay up to the amount by which
new competition would reduce its profits in order to acquire an exclusive right to it.'
That would be a classic case of rent seeking, or earning monopoly profits without
adding anything to production.102
In its Trebro decision the Federal Circuit addressed such a case. Whether the
patent holder was "dominant" in the product market was never addressed, because
the parties raised no antitrust issues and patent law does not require antitrust-like in-
quiries into firm dominance. But it is certainly possible, as it was the largest firm in
a market that apparently included only three firms.103 The patent holder was a pro-
ducer of sod-harvesting machines." It then acquired a substitute patent for an im-
portant part of the harvester that performed the same functions in a different way.'0o
However, it continued to use its old technology, leaving the acquired patent unused.0 I
When a rival firm built a machine that infringed the acquired but unused patent, the
patent holder sued."
The Federal Circuit used the case as an opportunity to qualify the post-eBay
position on injunctive relief for nonpracticing plaintiffs. It concluded that the plaintiff
was entitled to an injunction, notwithstanding its nonuse of the patented article, be-
cause the defendant was a direct competitor, thus stealing sales from the patent
holder. " As a result, it did not resemble the traditional NPE who does not practice
any patent at all and thus does not compete with producers. In fact, there are non-
antitrust grounds for doubting that injunctive relief is justified in such a case.'0 9
The disturbing thing about Trebro is the court's failure to take a broader view of
the implications for competition policy. In fairness, the defendant apparently never
raised the antitrust laws or competition policy as an objection. Assuming that the
patent holder was in fact a dominant firm, the court was effectively sanctioning a
101 For example, in a simple linear model of Cournot (output-based) competition, a duopolist earns a
little less than half of the monopoly profit. Thus, the monopolist would pay more than 50% of its
profits just to avoid the entry of a new competitor.
102 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN.
807 (1975).
103 See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (describing
market as having three players, and Firefly as a recent entrant). See also Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405
(involving a dominant firm).
104 Id. at 1162.
1o5 See id. at 1171.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1162.
los Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1170-71.
109 See Hovenkamp & Cotter, supra note 99, at 878-92 (arguing that, by entering the market with its
own technology before acquiring the infringed patent, the plaintiff revealed that injunctive relief was
not necessary to uphold his incentive to enter the market).
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strategy by which a firm buys up competing patents and shuts them down, thereby
expanding and prolonging monopoly in the market in question. Further, as noted
previously, to the extent that such an acquisition has any impact on either static or
dynamic efficiency, it must be regarded as negative. No antitrust lawyer in such a
case would neglect the patent issues while litigating the competition issues. To say
this a little differently, antitrust law takes patent policy into account all the time, while
patent litigation very largely ignores competition issues except in a few cases.
Assuming that the court had denied injunctive relief in Trebro, as it should have,
should the dominant firm be able to obtain damages from the infringer? Simply deny-
ing the injunction in Trebro would not solve the acquisition-plus-shutting-down prob-
lem if the infringement plaintiff were entitled to substantial damages for infringe-
ment."0 As an antitrust matter, the superior solution would be to prevent the
dominant firm from acquiring an exclusive right to a competing patent in the first
place, as a monopoly-enhancing asset acquisition under § 7 of the Clayton Act or else
under § 2 of the Sherman Act."' But in lieu of catching anticompetitive patent ac-
quisitions as they arise, the next best thing is simply to deny any remedy in an in-
fringement case.
B. Dominant Non-Practicing Entities
Systematic aggregation of substitute patents by a non-practicing entity (NPE)
can raise significant issues of both innovation and competitive harm, particularly
where the portfolio of these substitutes dominates the available technology space,
giving the NPE a dominant position in the relevant patent market. Unfortunately,
however, this "market space" question is not one that would ordinarily be raised in
patent litigation, because no provision in the Patent Act, nor any existing patent doc-
trines, make it relevant.
The principal difference between the dominant NPE and the dominant producer
lies in the particular things they want to accomplish through anticompetitive patent
acquisitions. As discussed in the previous section, the producer who dominates the
technology space wants to use this position to deprive its product market rivals of
access to the relevant technology class. Thus the motivation is exclusion. By con-
trast, the NPE does not want to cut off access entirely. After all, it makes no money
if its patents are not licensed or infringed. Rather, the NPE's goal is simply to raise
10 There may be some circumstances in which the antitrust laws could not be applied. For example,
the courts are more-or-less uniform in holding that the four-year antitrust statute of limitation on
acquisitions runs from the date of the acquisition, provided that it was not concealed, and not from
the date of a subsequent infringement action. The Sherman Act § 2 analysis would differ because
simply acquiring a patent is not a qualifying exclusionary practice. Exclusion would come when the
patent is enforced. See generally 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
320 (4th ed. 2014) (antitrust statute of limitations).
See notes 79-8 1.
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the license fees it can demand by eliminating inter-licensor competition, and it ac-
complishes this by buying up most of the externally-held patents that compete with
its own. This is a very basic strategy that is not limited to patent acquisitions. Any
firm can earn more by controlling competing goods or processes. This is why pow-
erful competing firms would essentially always like to merge or fix prices if they can
get away with it, or why a dominant firm might wish to buy up all known reserves of
an essential input.112
A second difference between NPEs and producers is that NPEs are typically
limited to damages when their patents are held valid and infringed. The Supreme
Court's eBay decision was an important victory against overreaching patent enforce-
ment, particularly by non-practicing entities that often hold large portfolios.113 The
Federal Circuit's rule that made injunctions in patent infringement cases virtually au-
tomatic had led to the prospect of significant holdup problems, particularly as against
unknowing infringers who had substantially invested in specific technology later
found to infringe.114 In an extreme case the threat of an injunction could induce an
infringement defendant o pay up its entire sunk investment."' Under eBay, however,
the patent holder must show its entitlement to an injunction under equity law's tradi-
tional four-factor test.116 In most cases involving non-practicing entities the second
factor is decisive: a firm that is not practicing it patents has only one expectation of
profit, and that is royalties, for which damages are an adequate substitute."
eBay addressed one of the more substantial holdup problems that can accrue
when non-practicing entities threaten firms with massive infringement liability."
112 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 35 F. Supp. 820, 822 (S.D. N.Y. 1940) (allegations
that Alcoa bought up 90% of known reserves of bauxite, an essential input into aluminum, in order
to deny access to rivals).
113 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). See discussion supra p. 21 and note 99.
114 E.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 2003 WL 23100881 (E. D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003) (holdup
of Blackberry handheld device; affirming finding of infringement and order granting injunction).
See Tim Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction: How a Tiny Little "Patent Troll" Got Blackberry
in a Headlock, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2006).
1s See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, 78-80 (2012).
116 The test requires proof (1) that the plaintiff has suffered or is threatened with irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies at law, such as damages, are inadequate; (3) that the balance of hardships as between
the parties favor the injunction; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the injunc-
tion. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
117 See e.g., Ricoh Co., Ltd. V. Quanta Computer, Inc., 2010 WL 1607908, at *1 (W.D.Wis. Apr.19,
2010); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 581 F.Supp.2d 160, 210 (D. Del. 2008); Clouding
IP, LLC v. Amazon. Com, Inc., 2013 WL 2293452, at *5 (D. Del. May 24, 2013); Laserdynamics,
Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-348, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61645, at *8 (E.D. Tex.
June 22, 2010); MercExchange LLC v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007). See
Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of "Private Law" Remedies, 92 TEx. L. REV. 517, 540-41
(2014).
"1 As one court observed:
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The threat of damages actions remains, however. The most troublesome threat is
damages actions based on multiple patents, accompanied by settlement offers that are
typically within litigation costs, or at least not much more than that. In the short run,
at least, the value of settling to the defendant is the expected cost of avoided litigation
plus the value of removing the possibility that validity and infringement would be
found. Even if this risk is small, a settlement might be the preferred course.119
NPE aggregation of substitute patents has never been condemned, and has only
recently been challenged at all. Several cases, some of which are ongoing, have con-
fronted the acquisition and enforcement activities of Intellectual Ventures (IV), a
large patent assertion entity (PAE) whose technologies serve many different product
markets, including the banking industry. IV acquired from outside inventors some
3,500 patents relating to transaction processing and similar activities in commercial
banking. Its apparent goal was to acquire control over all feasible alternative tech-
nologies for performing these activities. It then brought patent infringement actions
against several banks. Under eBay, IV as an NPE probably could not anticipate ob-
taining an injunction; however, it might obtain damages and, more importantly, hold
out the threat of litigating damages actions on a large number of patents as leverage
for obtaining a settlement. The banks responded by filing antitrust counterclaims
alleging that IV's activities constituted unlawful attempts to monopolize.12 0
Although PAEs [non-practicing patent assertion entities] rarely win the lawsuits they bring, that is be-
cause they rarely litigate them to judgment. The threat of costly and disruptive litigation is their
strongest tool, and it is a potent threat. 'TAEs often offer to settle for amounts well below litiga-
tion costs to make the business decision to settle an obvious one." This allows PAEs "to extract
licensing fees far out of proportion with the technology contributed by the patent."
Advanced Video Tech., LLC v. HTC corp., 2015 WL 7621483, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015) (internal
citations and footnote omitted) (citing and quoting Brian T. Yeh., Cong. Research Serv., R42668,
An Overview of the "Patent Trolls" Debate 1 (April 16, 2013), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker,
Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO L.J. 677, 694 (2011) (ob-
serving that NPEs lose roughly 92% of litigated infringement suits); Alan Devlin, Revisiting the
Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U.L. REV. 323, 349 (2008).
11 One reason for this is that a PAE may be willing to follow through on its litigation threat even if it
expects to lose money in court. By doing this whenever its demands are rejected, PAE may develop
a litigious reputation that persuades its targets to pay its demands whenever they are lower than the
cost of litigation, even if the underlying infringement claims are largely frivolous. See Erik
Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities Use Reputation to Mone-
tize Bad Patents, 1-6 (August 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors and avail-
able on SSRN).
120 Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 99 F.Supp.3d 610, 614-15 (D.Md.
2015) (sustaining monopolization claim); however, a subsequent decision dismissed the complaint
with leave to amend. An unpublished decision by the Federal Circuit on March 10, 2016, permitted
the antitrust claims to proceed. In re Intellectual Ventures, 646 Fed. Appx. 928 (Fed Cir. Mar. 10,
2016). Contra Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 2013 WL6 682981 at *6-8
(E.D.Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (rejecting Sherman Act Section 2 claim on analogous facts, largely on mar-
ket definition grounds).
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Under the Supreme Court's Walker Process doctrine an infringement action
based on a patent reasonably known by the plaintiff at the time of the lawsuit to be
unenforceable could constitute an attempt to monopolize.21 But this particular case
had not yet reached that stage, which usually involves a determination that a patent
identified in an infringement complaint was both unenforceable and should have been
known by the infringement plaintiff to be unenforceable. Rather, the infringement
defendants were making a very different claim, namely, that the mere act of aggre-
gating a large number of patents and bringing infringement actions on them consti-
tuted the attempt to monopolize, whether or not the patents were individually valid
and enforceable.
To illustrate the problem, suppose that a particular financial services process
could be accomplished by only three alternative patented means, called Alpha, Beta,
and Gamma. These three are either individual patents or else individual portfolios of
complementary patents. When owned by their original inventors or other assignees,
these three technologies would compete with one another and could be offered on
competitive terms. If a single entity acquired all three of them from diverse owners,
however, the effect would be to assemble them under a single owner, thus eliminating
competition in this market. Such a pattern of acquisitions could certainly violate § 2
of the Sherman Act. Under some circumstances it could also violate § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.1 22 Once the patent owner acquired the Alpha portfolio, the acquisition of
either the Beta or Gamma portfolios would be a horizontal merger. Acquiring all
three would constitute a merger to monopoly.
In analyzing this claim, one important issue is the relationship among the ac-
quired patents or portfolios. Complementary patents held by the same owner are
practiced together, and when so practiced they are more valuable than if they are
practiced individually. By contrast, competing patents or portfolios are used in the
place of one another and a firm would ordinarily practice one but not the others. The
antitrust counterclaim indicated that o a substantial extent the patents were compet-
ing, because IV's intent was to blanket all available paths to operating the systems
covered by the patents. To the extent that were true, it would not matter that most
others were also complementary.
Another relevant question is whether IV's acquisitions (or prior acquisitions by
other firms) actually assembled the competing patents into a single owner, or whether
they were invented by a single entity from the onset. For example, suppose that one
patentee had developed the technology and received all 3,500 patents as an individual
121 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). See 3 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 706 (4th ed. 2015).
122 As noted earlier, a patent is an "asset" subject to § 7's prohibition of anticompetitive asset acquisitions.
See discussion supra, text at note 71.
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inventor. In that case that patentee's assignment to IV would be a mere transfer of
the monopoly from one firm to another.123
Under the rule of reason for § 2, one must compare the anticompetitive effects
of a practice against its benefits.124 An acquisition of numerous competing patents by
an entity who is not using them and which blanket the alternatives in a market does
not present a close call. While patent policy encourages assignments or exclusive
licenses of patents, it does so principally to enable the acquiring firm to practice the
acquired patents. To be sure, such transactions also provide a market for small out-
side inventors, but antitrust policy forbids firms from assembling a monopoly through
acquisitions, even if such a practice produces higher prices for a seller.125 While pa-
tents are sometimes said to confer a "monopoly," that means no more than that they
have the power to exclude via infringement actions. Nothing in the patent act author-
izes the post-issuance creation of monopolies in a product or technology market by
assembling a portfolio of competing patents.
C. Dominant Users: Exclusive vs. Nonexclusive Licenses
Suppose that a firm with an already-dominant position in the relevant technol-
ogy market wants to secure the rights to use an external patent. That is, the firm
already owns some substitute technologies, but it prefers to use that covered by the
external patent. The market choices would be an assignment or an exclusive license,
which amount to the same thing, or else a non-exclusive license. The Patent Act ex-
pressly permits exclusive licenses, and there are good reasons for generally allowing
them.126 But the Patent Act says nothing about anticompetitive exclusive licenses
used to eliminate rivalry between alternative patented technologies.
Importantly, the nonexclusive license will give the dominant firm everything it
needs to improve its own production. It simply will not be able to sue for infringe-
ment or prevent the patent holder from issuing licenses to third parties. The question
is an important one because exclusive patent acquisitions can create formidable entry
barriers to those seeking to compete with a dominant firm. The appropriate antitrust
vehicles for assessing such practices would be either § 2 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits anticompetitive exclusions, or § 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits anti-
competitive acquisitions. Neither would usually be invoked by a nonexclusive
123 See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7' Cir. 1984).
124 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 369 (2016), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2687453.
125 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶701 (4th ed. 2015).
126 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). Allowing exclusive licenses is valuable in many contexts where the absence
of exclusivity would largely eliminate profits by driving prices down to marginal cost. For example,
competition between competing sellers of a pharmaceutical drug is notoriously intense, and often
involves substantially lower prices than those that a monopolist would set. Further, because the
patent typically dominates the product, the resulting output is largely undifferentiated. As such, the
incentive to develop a pharmaceutical drug may depend on the permissibility of exclusive licensing.
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license, however, given that the patent acquisition would not ordinarily enable the
dominant firm to reduce market wide product output.
One might wonder if the incentives of the external patent holder might work
against the dominant firm's ability to use the patent to anticompetitive ends. That is,
perhaps the dominant firm wants an exclusive license in order to prevent rivals from
using the technology, while the external patentee prefers to license nonexclusively to
both the dominant firm and its rivals. However, this favorable possibility is unlikely.
The external patentee's incentives are aligned with industry profits in the downstream
(product) market. As a general proposition the value of a monopoly right to the dom-
inant firm will be greater than the aggregate rights of multiple firms that practice the
technology in competition.
Suppose that, if the dominant firm owned the patent, it would prefer to deny its
product market rivals access to the patented technology. Then it must be that it would
earn less money by licensing to them than by excluding them. But this is true only if
licensing would reduce the joint profits of itself and its rivals. Thus, if the dominant
firm prefers to exclude rivals from using the patented technology, then it must be that
such exclusion maximizes total profits in the product market, and it therefore follows
that the external patentee's preferred strategy would be to provide an exclusive li-
cense. The dominant firm and the external patentee will tend to reach the same con-
clusions about the most profitable amount of exclusivity.
IV. Enforcement Limits vs. Administrative Oversight
Why use limitations on patent enforcement in order to effectuate what are es-
sentially competition law policies? The usual way to prevent anticompetitive mergers
and acquisitions is to rely on administrative oversight and either require pre-approval
or else catch them soon after they occur. For example, competing firms who wish to
merge must first provide "premerger notification" to one of the antitrust agencies.127
Early evaluation enables the relevant agency to challenge a merger before it occurs.
Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission has recently begun to require advance notifi-
cation of qualifying exclusive patent licenses in the pharmaceutical industry.'28 By
contrast, our proposed means of combatting anticompetitive patent acquisitions in-
volves limits on patent enforcement, not a broad expansion of administrative over-
sight designed to catch such acquisitions before or soon after they occur. This is not
to say that it would not be valuable to catch anticompetitive acquisitions at the outset.
Rather, this reflects that enforcement limits provide an efficient and more practicable
means of addressing the problem.
27 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000) (The Heart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act).
128 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (approving requirement
that assignments or exclusive licenses in some pharmaceutical patents be reported as asset acquisitions).
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As a matter of remedy, mergers of competing firms present different challenges
than mergers of competing patents. In an anticompetitive merger between rival firms,
the antitrust concern surrounds diminished competition between products, and the
volume and terms of product transactions are generally determined entirely by factors
relating to market structure and demand. Outside of price regulation, which is almost
never a realistic or advisable option, there are no external policy levers with which
we can avoid the adverse effects of the merger. Consequently, by altering market
structure in an adverse way, an anticompetitive merger between firms is likely to in-
jure consumers. The result is generally that the only way to prevent the merger's
anticompetitive effects is to prevent it from happening in the first place.
However, things are different in a market for patent rights. Here it is not market
forces alone that influence the terms of trade. The courts also play a major role.
Expectations about the outcome of litigation form a "threat point" that places an upper
bound on the amount a prospective user will pay for a license. The result is that the
volume and terms of transactions are distorted by the shadow of litigation. All else
being equal, if one patent is likely to be supported by weaker remedies than another
patent, then the rights to that first patent will command a lower price. For example,
if the Supreme Court establishes a new precedent under which a firm's patent is al-
most surely invalid, then prospective users may subsequently pay little or nothing for
a license, as they know that litigation would clear them of any obligation to pay for
the rights. Thus, in stark contrast to a conventional product market, the courts indi-
rectly control prices (license fees) and output (licensing agreements) through their
remedial standards.
This provides an alternative channel through which the anticompetitive effects
of patent mergers can be avoided. Rather than having to catch anticompetitive patent
acquisitions as they arise, it is sufficient simply to weaken enforcement by denying
remedies for patents that were acquired in violation of the antitrust laws. As soon as
the acquisition occurs, this renders the acquired patent largely impotent. Thus it will
not be very effective as a means of excluding one's rivals, for there are no remedies
that the acquirer can use as a deterrent. Furthermore, the rivals may use the threat of
declaratory judgment litigation (to establish that the acquisition was anticompetitive)
to compel a low price of access. For the same reasons, this rule diminishes an NPE's
ability to charge supra-competitive fees for an aggregated combination of substitute
patents. And, importantly, eliminating a firm's ability to monetize an anticompetitive
patent acquisition deters them from making such acquisitions in the first place.
Focusing on the enforcement stage also helps to avoid the monumental admin-
istrative costs that would be required to police patent acquisitions as they occur. Not
only are patents regularly exchanged in huge numbers-3,500 in the previously
noted Intellectual Ventures case-but they are also complex documents that re-
quire significant experience to interpret. Most have not yet been litigated at the time
they are transacted, and thus it is unlikely that they have been made subject to
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significant, individualized claim construction.129 It may take considerable resources
simply to determine whether two patents are substitutes. Further, technology markets
are generally harder to delimit than product markets (particularly as an empirical mat-
ter), and hence it may be very challenging to determine whether a given combination
of substitute patents would provide a dominant position in the relevant technology
market. It is thus unrealistic for the antitrust authorities to undertake such complex
investigations in all patent acquisitions that may potentially raise an antitrust issue.
On the other hand, the parties to a patent dispute will typically have considerable
knowledge about the relevant technology space, and the dispute itself is likely to shed
light on how the plaintiff's patent combination is operating in commerce. For exam-
ple, the defendant may have strong evidence that it has no feasible way of operating
in its product market without practicing one of several substitute patents acquired by
the plaintiff. Further, claim construction is an inevitable consequence of an infringe-
ment suit and can aid in determining the extent to which the infringement plaintiff s
patents operate as substitutes. Similarly, the plaintiffs licensing history, if it exists,
may shed light on what kinds of applications the patents are being used for. The court
can utilize all of this information to make important determinations relating to the
antitrust inquiry, such as what the relevant technology market is and whether the
plaintiff purchased his way into a dominant position.
For example, it is relatively common for firms to acquire large patent portfolios
that subsume many different technologies that perform a wide range of functions. In
most cases, the portfolio includes both complements and substitutes, but it may be
very challenging to sort out the complements from the substitutes. Thus, rather than
going through the portfolio at the outset to determine whether some of the acquired
patents raise an antitrust question, it is much simpler to simply wait until such patents
are enforced. This avoids the costs of investigating acquired patents that pose no
antitrust concerns or that will never be enforced. And to the extent that the portfolio
includes some patents that the purchaser should not have been permitted to acquire,
the limitation on damages renders them largely benign.
A third way, which has fallen out of popularity, is the judge-made patent "mis-
use" doctrine, which seems ideally suited for this purpose. While that doctrine is
explicitly a creature of patent rather than antitrust law, it historically has been thought
of as applying antitrust-like principles to patent practices. Furthermore, in the great
majority of cases it is asserted as a defense to an infringement suit, as would be true
here.130 A court would be asked to hold that an infringement action that threatened
competition unnecessarily constitutes "misuse," thereby rendering the patent
129 But cf Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., 2010 WL 4878835, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (licensee
of large portfolio complaining that it would be extremely costly to determine which of the thousands
of patents it infringed or what their coverage was).
130 See Bohannan, supra note 58; 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
TT 1781-82 (3d ed. 2011).
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unenforceable under the circumstances. As noted, however, the Federal Circuit has
cut back so severely on misuse doctrine that it has become practically defunct.'31 This
was very largely in reaction to severe excesses in the twentieth century, and a cutback
was clearly justified.'32 However, a leaner and more focused doctrine of misuse could
serve a valuable purpose in cases such as these. The fact that misuse doctrine attaches
at the point of an infringement action rather than the patent acquisition itself makes it
all the more valuable.
V. Impact on Innovation
How will our proposal affect innovation incentives? That ultimately depends
on how it affects competition, which in turn affects private incentives to invent. Be-
cause our proposed limitations do not apply in situations where the plaintiff invented
the relevant technologies itself, we are principally concerned with the incentives of
the original inventors who sell their patents. To that end, one point already mentioned
is that an inventor who wishes to sell its patent can generally make the most money
by selling its patent to a firm that already dominates the relevant technological mar-
ket. This reflects that profits are higher when a market is more concentrated, and thus
a transaction will tend to be more lucrative to the extent that it promotes market con-
centration. As such, if an inventor anticipates selling its patent, then it may have a
strong interest in being able to sell to a dominant patent holder who is willing to pay
a high price for an exclusive right, but our proposed enforcement limitations would
prevent this. Thus the reader may be concerned that our proposal will advance anti-
trust interests at the expense of patent policy objectives. In particular, won't our pro-
posal diminish the incentive to innovate by limiting the rents that external inventors
can get by selling their patents?
The answer is no. It is indeed true that an external inventor could generally get
a higher price from a dominant patent holder than from a collection of non-dominant
rivals. But this example is inapt; it presupposes a market that is not very competitive,
and it focuses on a single transaction within this environment. It then asks how the
inventor's payoff changes when enforcement limitations prevent it from selling its
patent to the dominant firm at a high price, but in doing so it continues to assume that
the market is just as noncompetitive as before. As such, it totally disregards the prin-
cipal effect of discouraging anticompetitive patent acquisitions, namely that this will
make the technology market more competitive.
With respect to the external innovator's incentives, the relevant comparison is
between: (1) a noncompetitive market that involves no limits on enforcement; and (2)
a relatively competitive market that places some limits on enforcement. The fact that
'' Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); See also Hovenkamp, Antitrust
and the Patent System: A Reexamination, supra note 10, at 468-73, 561-62.
132 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at in 1781-82.
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a patent holder in situation (1) gets the highest price by selling to the dominant firm
does not in any way suggest hat this price is also higher than the one he would receive
in situation (2). That is, a competitive firm in (2) might pay more than the dominant
firm in (1).133 Furthermore, it may be that the firms themselves would do more inter-
nal innovation when the market is more competitive, as in scenario (2). As these
points illustrate, in order to tease out the aggregate impact of enforcement limitations
on invention, we must ultimately inquire into the impact of increased competition on
innovation incentives.
A leading view in the modem economic literature on innovation-the inverted
U hypothesis-posits hat aggregate innovation in a market is highest when the mar-
ket is relatively competitive, but not too competitive. More specifically, it says that,
as a function of market competitiveness, total innovation takes an inverted U shape:
beginning at monopoly, innovation initially increases as the degree of competition
rises, but eventually innovation reaches a peak beyond which further increases in







FIGURE 1: THE INVERTED U HYPOTHESIS
The inverted U hypothesis has strong theoretical and empirical support.' Fur-
ther, the empirical literature tends to suggest that the optimal degree of competition-
that corresponding to the peak of the inverted U-is closer to perfect competition
133 Similarly, it could be that several competitive firms in (2) would pay jointly more for nonexclusive
licenses than the dominant firm in (1) would pay for an exclusive license.
134 See Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. ECON.
701, 701-03 (2005) (providing theoretical and empirical support for the inverted U hypothesis).
135 See, e.g., id.; Ronald L. Goettler & Brett R. Gordon, Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More?, 119
J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1174 (2011); Patrik G. Tingvall & Andreas Poldahl, Is There Really an Inverted-
U Shaped Relation Between Competition and R&D?, 15 ECoN. OF Innov. & New Tech. 101, 112-
13 (2006).
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than to monopoly.'36 For our purposes, the important takeaway is that monopoly
power is generally not good for promoting innovation. Rather, there should be a
relatively significant degree of competition in order to maximize innovative output
within a given technology space.
The inverted U hypothesis suggests hat limiting enforcement of certain exter-
nally acquired patents will increase total innovative activity, provided that such limits
are triggered only by acquisitions that serve to expand or maintain a dominant patent
holder's market position in the relevant technology space. Anticompetitive patent
acquisitions facilitate monopoly or, at the very least, substantially concentrated (i.e.
noncompetitive) markets. Thus, to the extent that such transactions are both possible
and permissible, the result will be systematic monopoly over time. That is, the dom-
inant firm will tend to remain as such, and thus the market will remain noncompeti-
tive. But firms would invest more in innovation overall if the market were more
competitive. All else being equal, the firms would also spend more in total for exter-
nal patent rights, implying that independent inventors who sell their patents are in-
deed better off when the market is somewhat competitive.' As such, limiting en-
forcement of patents acquired anticompetitively will not only serve antitrust policy
interests, but will also promote the patent system's principal objective of facilitating
innovation.
VI. Conclusion
Although patent alienability is largely a good thing, in some cases it can be used
to anticompetitive ends. Firms may aggregate substitute patents from external
sources in order to achieve an unearned monopoly position in the relevant echnology
space. Analogous anticompetitive acquisitions are regularly condemned in ordinary
(non-patent) contexts, but the courts have not yet applied the same logic to patent
acquisitions. This paper proposes that damages should be withheld if the litigated
patent was obtained in an anticompetitive acquisition, meaning that the assignment
served to expand or perpetuate the patent holder's dominant position in the technol-
ogy market. This prevents patent holders from using such acquisitions to
136 See Aghion et al., supra note 133, at 706 (showing a graph of the empirically-estimated inverted U
relationship, which has the property that total innovation, measured by citation-weighted patents, is
maximized when the residual 1 -L is close to 1, where L the Lerner index, which serves as a metric
for market competitiveness); Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 114.
17 This result follows from the fact that the theoretical models supporting the inverted U focus on the
aggregate amount firms are willing to invest in improving their products (which could be accom-
plished by securing external patent rights, although this is not usually stated explicitly) as the relevant
measure of innovative activity. See Aghion et al., supra note 133, at 711-15. Thus, all else being
equal, firms would be willing to spend a larger total amount for external patents when the market is
relatively competitive than when it is monopolized. The intuition is simply that the firms' total
"demand for innovation" is highest at an intermediate degree of competition.
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anticompetitive ends. By avoiding systematic monopoly in technology markets, such
limits on enforcement will also promote patent policy by increasing aggregate inno-
vation.
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